1.1The Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 (the Bill or ANNPS) is deeply flawed legislation that is only being progressed because of the deeply flawed trilateral agreement that is AUKUS.

1.2The Bill proposes a seriously flawed regulatory model for the dangers of naval nuclear reactors and associated waste.

1.3 The proposed regulator lacks genuine independence, the process for dealing with nuclear waste is recklessly indifferent to community or First Nations interests and the level of secrecy is a threat to both the environment and the public interest.

1.4 Any amendments proposed to improve the many deficiencies of this legislation should not be interpreted as support for the Bill itself or for the AUKUS deal.

1.5 This Bill establishes a new defence naval nuclear regulator that will oversee all aspects of the nuclear production and waste cycle associated with Australian nuclear-powered submarines (and with regard to waste but not the operational activities of UK and US submarines) that operate, are constructed or decommissioned in Australia and Australian territorial waters.

1.6 This regulator will be entirely separate from the existing and long-standing nuclear regulation framework in Australia, which currently sits under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (ARPANS Act).

Independence

1.7This Bill fails to meet the fundamental international principles of regulatory independence for safely addressing the inherent risks of nuclear power and nuclear waste.

1.8In this Bill, the proposed Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator reports directly to the Minister of Defence. The Defence Minister is also responsible, through the Australian Defence Force, for the operation of those same nuclear submarines.

1.9 This is widely out of step with international standards of legal and functional independence for nuclear safety and is contrary to current practice on civil nuclear regulation in Australia.

1.10This is also in direct opposition to the International Atomic Energy Agency in its Fundamental Safety Principles that state: An effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained.^[1]

1.11It is also not in line with the current regulation of nuclear waste in Australia. The regulator, called the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) sits in the Ministry of Health whereas the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) (which operates the Lucas Heights reactor) sits in the Ministry of Industry and Science. This is to ensure the regulator is independent of the industry it oversees.

1.12As the majority report notes in some detail, the proposed model under this Bill is distinct from either the UK or US naval nuclear regulators.

1.13 In the UK, while the main naval nuclear regulator does report through the Ministry of Defence, there is a significant ongoing role for the independent civilian Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) in overseeing defence nuclear activities. This is formalised in the General Agreement between the Ministry of Defence and the Office for Nuclear Regulation. This agreement clearly delineates the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the ONR in discharging their respective roles and responsibilities for the UK’s defence nuclear operations. There is no equivalent role for ARPANSA in this Bill.

In the US, the regulator is known as the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP). This is not run solely by Defense but rather is jointly managed and self-regulated by the civilian National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) that reports to the Department of Energy, and the Department of the Navy. By contrast, under this Bill the regulator will be entirely within the Department of Defence and the Defence Minister will have sole ministerial responsibility.

1.15The importance of regulatory independence was outlined in a letter to the CEO of ARPANSA from the Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council in October 2022 that stated:

Independence of the regulator is a critical part of its effectiveness. The regulator should be independent of the operators and departments overseeing any aspect of purchase, manufacture, maintenance, and operation of the program. It is noted that some of the more significant global nuclear and radiation incidents have arisen from inadequate separation of responsibilities from regulatory capture. More than functional separation, it is important that the independent regulator can operate without influence, and with a strong voice. If a regulatory body cannot provide information on safety and incidents at licensed facilities without the approval of another organisation, issues of independence and transparency will arise. Reporting arrangements should therefore enable the regulatory body to be able to provide safety related information to the Government and the public with the maximum amount of transparency.^[2]

1.16During a committee hearing, these concerns were put to the Royal Institution of Naval Architects (RINA), concerning the importance of independence in ‘social licence’:

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: We have good examples, though, of independence. ANSTO is an operator. The regulator of ANSTO reports to a different minister, and that is part of how ANSTO gets social licence. That’s a good example, isn’t it, of structural independence?……………………………………………………

ARPANSA also acknowledged that the key to their social licences was independence through reporting to a minister not associated with the industry they are regulating

1.18In further questioning concerning how this independence can be achieved with the Defence Minister having both the regulator and the body it’s regulating reporting to them, ARPANSA stated:

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Do you agree it’s a weakness in this bill to have the operator and the regulator both report to the same minister? Or if you don’t want to adopt my phrase, tell me how you would respond to the fact that the regulator and the operator both report to the same minister, given the fundamental importance of independence?

Dr Hirth: I think it’s important to go back to the IAEA, and I think the comments made by RINA in your questions to them this morning around undue influence. Establishing reporting arrangements in order that there isn’t undue influence of interested parties does present a challenge for the Minister for Defence…………………………….

1.19Furthermore, there were concerns raised about the development of a new regulatory body, with all the concerns of independence with the ANNPS Bill, which may also lack the expertise needed……………..

The ability of the Minister through proposed section 105 to issue directions to the regulator further blurs the independence of the new regulator. This was a concern for the Australian Shipbuilding Federation of Unions (ASFU),……………………………………………

1.21Another aspect of the lack of independence concerns the staffing and leadership of the new regulator. It is true that neither the Director-General nor Deputy Director-General can be an active member of the ADF (Australian Defence Force) as specified in proposed section 109.

1.22 However, there is nothing stopping someone from immediately stepping out of the ADF and the next day becoming the Director-General or Deputy Director-General, as this exchange with Defence made clear:……………………………………………………..

1.23 Furthermore, there are no such restrictions on the staff of the regulator, which may all be drawn from active ADF personnel.

1.24 This means the supposed independent regulator of Defence can be run by someone who, the day before was in the Defence, staffed by the Defence and report to the Minister of Defence.

Recommendation 1

1.25 It is recommended that the Bill be amended to ensure a genuinely independent regulator and that the regulator reports to the Minister of Health rather than the Minister of Defence.

1.26 Alternatively, that the regulator more closely reflects the arrangements in the United States and jointly reports to both the Minister of Health and the Minister for Defence, with these Ministers jointly holding Ministerial responsibility under the Bill.

Recommendation 2

1.27 It is recommended that for transparency any direction issued under section 105 be tabled in Parliament within three days where the direction may, or will, negatively impact public health or safety.

Recommendation 3

1.28 It is recommended that section 109 be amended to:

prohibit the Director General from being a current or former member of the ADF or Department of Defence, and;

that the Deputy Director General not be a current member of the ADF or Department of Defence or have been a member of the ADF or Department of Defence for at least two years prior to any appointment.

No public or First Nations consultation

1.29This Bill allows the Minister of Defence to establish ‘designated zones’ for the storage, management and disposal of low, medium and high-level nuclear waste in any part of Australia the Minister chooses by regulation.

1.30This Bill establishes an initial two zones, one at HMAS Stirling at Garden Island in Western Australia and another at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in South Australia. Both zones are close to major metropolitan centres.

1.31Concerning future nuclear waste dumps, the Minister for Defence has indicated that they will only be on Defence land, however, that includes large parcels of land within every major population centre in the country. The Minister also said this can include ‘future’ Defence land.^[9]

1.32However, the Bill does not provide even this limitation on where nuclear waste can be located. In fact, the Bill says in bold terms the waste can be on defence land or ‘any other area in Australia’ identified in the regulations. This means, with the flick of the Minister’s pen, any location in Australia can be made into a high-level nuclear waste dump.

1.33This completely excludes any consultation with the local impacted community or with First Nations people whose land and water will be targeted by Defence. With this Bill, neighbours to large defence sites like Holsworthy in Sydney or Greenbank in Brisbane are right to be concerned that they may wake up one morning, with no notice, to find they back onto a high-level nuclear waste dump.

1.34 We have seen from decades of failed attempts to set up nuclear waste sites across the country, most recently at Kimba, that Federal governments have routinely sought to override First Nations people’s claims to the land on this issue. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) specifies the importance of free, prior and informed consent before any such action is taken. This Bill does not even pretend to engage with these principles.

1.35 As the submission from Friends of the Earth stated:

First Nations communities have repeatedly defeated thuggish, racist governments in relation to radioactive waste facilities but that has come at a huge cost in terms of physical and mental health.^[10]

1.36The few protections that the law currently gives to First Nations people over their land are removed by this Bill. The Independent and Peaceful Australia Network raised this during a hearing, stating:

There doesn’t seem to have been any notice taken of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. They should have the right to prior informed consent on this issue and have full consultation before any designations are made for nuclear waste.^[11]

1.37Multiple submissions also raised the comments by Dr Marcos Orellana, UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics and Human Rights, in 2023 on this issue, saying:

It is instructive that all siting initiatives by the Government for a radioactive waste repository have failed, leaving a legacy of division and acrimony in the communities. The loss of lives and songlines resulting from exposure of Indigenous peoples to hazardous pesticides in the Kimberley region, from asbestos exposure in Wittenoom in Western Australia, and from the radioactive contamination following nuclear weapons testing in South Australia, are all open wounds. Alignment of regulations with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a critical step in the path towards healing open wounds of past environmental injustices.^[12]

1.38Concerning the proposed nuclear ‘designated zone’ in Perth, Nuclear Free WA and Stop AUKUS WA noted the importance of the areas around HMAS Stirling, stating in their submission:

Cockburn Sound and Garden Island have significant cultural value for First Nations Peoples … The ecological values of Garden Island, the proximity to Cockburn Sound make radioactive waste disposal here incompatible.^[13]

1.39 It is remarkable that on an issue so vital to communities, the potential location of a nuclear waste dump, there is zero public consultation required under this Bill. Compare this to existing laws such as the National Radioactive Waste Management Act 2012, where a site must be voluntarily nominated, evaluated against technical, economic, social and environmental criteria, and offered for public consultation.

1.40 This, together with the express inclusion of the UNDRIP principles, is the minimum standard that should be expected under this Bill for public and First Nations consultation.

Recommendation 4

1.41 It is recommended that the Bill must ensure that there is free, prior and informed consent from First Nations people and the communities impacted before any designated zone is established for low, medium or high-level naval nuclear waste.

Recommendation 5

1.42 It is recommended that the Bill should expressly include reference to, and compliance with, Australia’s international obligations including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Recommendation 6

1.43 It is recommended that the Bill should adopt the requirements for public consultation and site identification for designated nuclear zones found in the National Radioactive Waste Management Act 2012.

Transparency and collaboration

1.44 The ARPANS Act has key elements to ensure the management of nuclear waste is done in collaboration with other experts and bodies, as well as openly with the public. This Bill fails on both of these fronts……………………………………………………………………………………………

1.47 By creating a legally and functionally separate naval nuclear regulator this Bill ignores decades of experience in both the UK and the US where there is a co-regulatory civil and defence regime. This not only ignores international experience, it also ignores the decades of experience held in Australia’s civilian nuclear regulators and advisers. This is a reckless proposal that will leave Defence to be both the nuclear operator and the nuclear regulator without having ongoing advice from an independent body.

Recommendation 7

1.48 It is recommended that the Bill should require close co-operation and consultation between the proposed naval nuclear regulator and the civilian regulator ARPANSA.

Recommendation 8

1.49 It is recommended that the Bill should be amended to ensure that the Director General receives advice from the relevant nuclear safety advisory groups including the Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council, Radiation Health Committee and the Nuclear Safety Committee.

UK and US nuclear waste dumping ground

1.50 As noted above the Bill is drafted to allow the UK and US to dump nuclear waste, including high-level nuclear waste, from their existing and decommissioned nuclear submarines in Australia.

1.51 Despite Minister Marles rejecting this as ‘fear-mongering’ when first raised, this fact was admitted by multiple witnesses, including Defence officials and BAE Systems Australia. It also flows from any even moderately close reading of the Bill.^[16]

1.52 It turned out to be significantly more than this with numerous organisations confirming that this Bill indeed does allow for the dumpling of nuclear waste in Australia from UK and US submarines.

1.53 Mr Peter Quinlivian, Senior Legal Counsel, BAE Systems Australia admitted the law would permit the dumping of nuclear waste from UK nuclear submarines in the following exchange:…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

1.54 Mr Adam Beeson, General Counsel, Australian Conservation Foundation, further corroborated this information said:………………………………………………………………………….

1.55 Mr Kim Moy, Assistant Director-General of the Domestic Nuclear Policy Branch, Department of Defence also admitted that this Bill would allow for the dumping of foreign nuclear waste:……………………………………………………

1.56 Question on Notice 1 from Defence during this hearing also made clear that the current definition is not just limited to low-level nuclear waste, but high-level nuclear waste too.^[20]

1.57 This is particularly disturbing given the UK currently has no plan to dispose of the nuclear waste from their nuclear submarines. In the UK there are now six decades of decommissioned rusting nuclear submarines that are filled with high and medium-level nuclear waste for which they have no solution.

1.58 To be clear, under this Bill, there is a real and present danger that either this government or a future government will allow UK nuclear waste to be brought to Australia. This is an extraordinary proposal and is so clearly not in Australia’s interests, let alone the interests of communities and First Nations peoples on whose land this toxic waste will be dumped.

1,59 Mr Dave Sweeny, Nuclear Policy Analyst, Australian Conservation Foundation addressed these concerns ………………………………………………………..

1.60If the AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is to splutter on, then it must not be allowed to become a back door entry for the world’s most toxic nuclear waste.

Recommendation 9

1.61 The Bill must be amended to ensure that no UK or US nuclear waste can be stored or disposed of in Australia.

Overrides other laws

1.62 This Bill also seeks to override or disregard other laws and international obligations.

1.63 For example, the Bill allows for the Minister to override State and Territory laws that might limit where the Federal Government proposes nuclear waste will be stored through proposed section 135 which reads:

If a law of a State or Territory, or one or more provisions of such a law, is prescribed by the regulations, that law or provision does not apply in relation to a regulated activity.

1.64 This issue has been noted by local communities and environmental groups including David J Noonan who stated in his submission:

The Bill is undemocratic and disrespectful to the people of SA in a proposed power under Section 135 “Operation of State and Territory laws” to over-ride any SA Laws or provisions of our Laws effectively by decree, a fiat of unaccountable federal agents to annul our Laws by naming then in Regulations.^[22]

Recommendation 10

1.68 It is recommended that section 135 of the Bill should be removed to retain existing State and Territory protections for the safe treatment of nuclear materials.

Recommendation 11

1.69 It is recommended, to ensure the Bill meets the existing requirements for Australia’s nuclear safety regime to be consistent with international standards, that section 136 be amended to require functions performed to be in accordance with, rather than simply to have regard to, prescribed international agreements.

1.70 Each of the above amendments are intended to strengthen a dangerously undercooked bill. Taken together they would significantly strengthen the proposed regulatory regime to make it more independent and to ensure the public interest, public consultation and First Nations’ rights are respected.

1 .71 However, even if all were adopted, the Bill’s express purpose is to facilitate Australia spending some $368 billion to obtain a handful of nuclear submarines. This entire project comes at an eye-watering cost that strips vital public resources from addressing the climate challenge, the housing crisis and rising economic inequality in our country.

1.72 For all these reasons the Bill should be rejected by the Parliament in its entirety.

Recommendation 12

1.73 It is recommended that the Bill be rejected in full.

Senator David Shoebridge, Substitute member, Greens Senator for New South Wales

Footnotes …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..  https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/ANNPSBills23/Report/Australian_Greens_dissenting_report?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR05CTHduGYDKKcA97g2CvxUE5GZijeBqCITeyjzP0E6YtRmwA_t1EDhwE0_aem_AfsyqQjkM1ez6NUjpa-gSqQ_S_XuhvR6d41rhpWq5VIanWmfHvNRjs3Fqrq_uzaOhVymvSX39Jdbj-LRRbQGamPl

Current prohibitions on nuclear activities in Australia: a quick guide

From Jim Green, 30 May 2024

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp2324/Quick_Guides/NuclearActivitiesProhibitions
PDF Version [564KB]
Dr Emily Gibson
Science, Technology, Environment and Resources; Law and Bills Digest Sections
This quick guide provides an overview of current prohibitions on nuclear activities under Commonwealth, state and territory laws. It considers the primary legislation most relevant to current policy debates about domestic nuclear energy only and consequently does not consider recent changes to Commonwealth law to facilitate Australia’s acquisition of conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership.[1] It also does not include consideration of Australia’s international obligations in respect of nuclear activities, including the safeguarding of nuclear materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

If a domestic nuclear energy industry were to progress, it is expected that a comprehensive framework for the safety, security and safeguarding of the related nuclear material would need to be legislated to accommodate such an industry.[2] Consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.

What are nuclear activities?

A nuclear activity is any process or step in the utilisation of material capable of undergoing nuclear fission; that is, any activities in the nuclear fuel cycle.[3] Nuclear activities therefore include:

• mining of nuclear or radioactive materials such as uranium and thorium milling, refining, treatment, processing, reprocessing, fabrication or enrichment of nuclear material  
• the production of nuclear energy 
• the construction, operation or decommissioning of a mine, plant, facility, structure, apparatus or equipment used in the above activities
• the use, storage, handling, transportation, possession, acquisition, abandonment or disposal of nuclear materials, apparatus or equipment.

Prohibitions on nuclear activities

Commonwealth

Nuclear activities are regulated under the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (ARPANS Act) and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).

Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998

The ARPANS Act establishes a licensing framework for controlled persons (including a Commonwealth entity or a Commonwealth contractor) in relation to controlled facilities (a nuclear installation, a prescribed radiation facility, or a prescribed legacy site).[4] A nuclear installation includes a nuclear reactor for research or the production of radioactive materials for industrial or medical use, and a radioactive waste storage or disposal facility with an activity that is greater than the activity level prescribed by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Regulations 2018.[5]

The ARPANS Act allows the CEO of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency   (ARPANSA) to issue licences for controlled facilities.[6] In issuing a facility licence, the CEO ‘must take into account the matters (if any) specified in the regulations, and must also take into account international best practice in relation to radiation protection and nuclear safety’.[7]

However, subsection 10(2) of the Act expressly prohibits the CEO from granting a licence for the construction or operation of any of the following nuclear installations: a nuclear fuel fabrication plant; a nuclear power plant; an enrichment plant; or a reprocessing facility.[8] This prohibition does not appear to apply to a radioactive waste storage or disposal facility.

Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999

The EPBC Act establishes 9 matters of national environmental significance (MNES) and provides for the assessment and approval of these actions if the action has, will have, or is likely to have a significant impact on the MNES.[9] ‘Nuclear actions’ are one of the MNES.[10] Where a nuclear action is determined to be a controlled action (that is, one likely to have a significant impact and requiring assessment and approval under the Act), the assessment considers the impact of a nuclear action on the environment generally (including people and communities).[11]

The Act establishes offences for the taking of nuclear actions in those circumstances.[14]

Similarly, the Act provides that a relevant entity (as set out below) must not take an action (including a nuclear action) unless a requisite approval has been obtained under Part 9 of the Act or a relevant exception applies:

• a person must not take a relevant action on Commonwealth land that has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact on the environment[15]   
•  a person must not take a relevant action outside Commonwealth land if the action has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact on the environment on Commonwealth land[16]  
• the Commonwealth or a Commonwealth agency must not take inside or outside the Australian jurisdiction an action that has, will have or is likely to have a significant impact on the environment inside or outside the Australian jurisdiction.[17]

The Act establishes offences and civil penalty provisions for the taking of an action in those circumstances.[18]

Subsection 140A(1) prohibits the Minister for the Environment from granting an approval for a nuclear action relating to specified nuclear installations. These installations are a nuclear fuel fabrication plant, a nuclear power plant, an enrichment plant, and a reprocessing facility.

Potential reform of the nuclear action trigger

The second independent review of the EPBC Act, completed in October 2020 by Professor Graeme Samuel (Samuel Review), recommended that the nuclear actions MNES be retained.[19] The review recommended that ‘the EPBC Act and the regulatory arrangements of [ARPANSA] should be aligned, to support the implementation of best-practice international approaches based on risk of harm to the environment, including the community’.[20]

In 2022, the Government’s Nature Positive Plan adopted this approach and stated, ‘[a] uniform national approach to regulation of radiation will be delivered through the new National Environmental Standards’.

In February 2024, a policy draft of the National Environmental Standard for Matters of National Environmental Significance indicates that ‘nuclear actions’ will be renamed ‘radiological exposure actions’ and states:

Relevant decisions must:

   Not be inconsistent with the ARPANSA national codesfor protection from radiological exposure actions including in relation to:   

1.  human health and environmental risks and outcomes; and. radiological impacts on biological diversity, 
2. the conservation of species and the natural health of ecosystems.[22]

States and territories

States and territories generally regulate nuclear and radiation activities through either the health or the environmental protection portfolios. The relevant legislation provides for the protection of health and safety of people, and the protection of property and the environment, from the harmful effects of radiation by establishing licensing regimes to regulate the possession, use, and transportation of radiation sources and substances.[23] Mining of radioactive materials is regulated through the resources portfolio.

In addition, as outlined below, the states and territories have legislation prohibiting certain nuclear activities or the construction and operation of certain nuclear facilities. Importantly, where permitted, nuclear activities (including mining) would also be subject to assessment and approvals under a range of other legislation, including planning and environmental impact assessment, native title and cultural heritage, and radiation licensing laws at the state or territory and Commonwealth level.

New South Wales

Exploration for uranium has been permitted under the Mining Act 1992 since 2012.[24] However, the mining of uranium is prohibited by the Uranium Mining and Nuclear Facilities (Prohibitions) Act 1986 (NSW Prohibitions Act).[25]

The NSW Prohibitions Act also prohibits the construction and operation of certain nuclear facilities, including uranium enrichment facilities, fabrication and reprocessing plants, nuclear power plants, and storage and waste disposal facilities (other than for the storage and disposal of waste from research or medical purposes, or the relevant radiological licensing Act).[26]

Northern Territory

The Atomic Energy Act 1953 (Cth) provides that the Commonwealth owns all uranium found in the territories.[27] Uranium exploration and mining in the Northern Territory (NT) is regulated under both NT mining laws (the Mineral Titles Act 2010 and the Mining Management Act 2001) and the Atomic Energy Act.^[28] The Ranger Uranium Mine operated until 2021 and is now undergoing rehabilitation.[29]

The Nuclear Waste Transport, Storage and Disposal (Prohibition) Act 2004 (NT) prohibits the construction and operation of nuclear waste storage facilities, as well as the transportation of nuclear waste for storage at a nuclear waste storage facility in the NT.[30] Nuclear waste is defined as including waste material from nuclear plants or the conditioning or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.[31]

This Act also:

•  prohibits public funds from being expended, granted or advanced to any person for, or for encouraging or financing any activity associated with the development, construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility  
•  would require the NT Parliament to hold an inquiry into the likely impact of a nuclear waste storage facility proposed by the Commonwealth on the cultural, environmental and socio‑economic wellbeing of the territory.[32]

Queensland

Exploration for and mining of uranium are permitted under the Mineral Resources Act 1989. However, it has been government policy to not grant mining leases for uranium since 2015.[33] The government policy ban extends to the treatment or processing of uranium within the state.[34]

The Nuclear Facilities Prohibition Act 2007, in similar terms to the NSW Prohibitions Act, prohibits the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle.[35]

Unlike other state and territory prohibition legislation, the Nuclear Facilities Prohibition Act would require the responsible Queensland Minister to hold a plebiscite to gain the views of the Queensland population if the Minister was satisfied that the Commonwealth Government has taken, or is likely to take, steps to amend a Commonwealth law or exercise a power under a Commonwealth law to facilitate the construction of a prohibited nuclear facility, or if the Commonwealth Government adopts a policy position of supporting or allowing the construction of a prohibited nuclear facility in Queensland.[36]

South Australia

The exploration and mining of radioactive material (including uranium) is permitted in South Australia (SA), subject to approvals under the Mining Act 1971 and the Radiation Protection and Control Act 2021 (RP&C Act).[37] For example, uranium is mined at Olympic Dam, Four Mile and Honeymoon. However, conversion and enrichment activities are prohibited by the RP&C Act.[38]

The Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000 prohibits the construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility, and the import to SA or transport within SA of nuclear waste for delivery to a nuclear waste storage facility.[39]

The Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act prohibits the SA Government from expending public funds to encourage or finance the construction or operation of nuclear waste storage facilities.^[40] The Act would also require the SA Parliament to hold an inquiry into the proposed construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility in SA authorised under a Commonwealth law.[41]

Tasmania

The exploration and mining of atomic substances (which includes uranium and thorium) is permitted under the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 (Tas), subject to approval.

Victoria

The Nuclear Activities (Prohibitions) Act 1983 prohibits a range of activities associated with the nuclear fuel cycle, including the exploration and mining of uranium and thorium, and the construction or operation of facilities for the conversion or enrichment of any nuclear material, nuclear reactors and facilities for the storage and disposal of nuclear waste from those prohibited activities.[42]

Western Australia

Exploration for and mining of uranium is permitted under the Mining Act 1978. A state policy ban on mining approvals was overturned in November 2008;[43] however, this was reinstated in June 2017, with a ‘no uranium’ condition on future mining leases.[44] The ban does not apply to 4 projects that had already been approved by the previous government.

The Nuclear Activities Regulation Act 1978 aims to protect the health and safety of people and the environment from possible harmful effects of nuclear activities, including by regulating the mining and processing of uranium and the equipment used in those processes. The Nuclear Waste Storage and Transportation (Prohibition) Act 1999 also prohibits the storage, disposal or transportation in Western Australia of certain nuclear waste (including waste from a nuclear plant or nuclear weapons).[45]

Can the Commonwealth override a state ban on nuclear activities?

The Commonwealth Parliament only has the power to make laws in relation to matters specified in the Constitution of Australia, including in sections 51, 52 and 122. Assuming the Commonwealth has a sufficient head of power to legislate, section 109 of the Constitution specifically provides for circumstances in which there might be an inconsistency between Commonwealth and state laws:

When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.

Therefore, even though some states have enacted prohibitions on certain nuclear activities within their jurisdictions, the Commonwealth Parliament could enact specific legislation in relation to nuclear activities so that such activities can take place within those jurisdictions. One such example is the National Radioactive Waste Management Act 2012 (Cth), which provides for the establishment of a national radioactive waste management facility at a site to be declared by the responsible Commonwealth Minister. Section 12 of that Act provides that state and territory laws have no effect in regulating, hindering, or preventing such a facility

Further information

• ‘Who we regulate’, ARPANSA 
•  ‘State & territory regulators’, ARPANSA    
• ‘Uranium and thorium’, in Geoscience Australia, Australia’s Energy Commodity Resources, 2023 Edition, (Canberra: Geoscience Australia, 2023).

by Sue Rabbitt Roff | Jun 28, 2024 https://michaelwest.com.au/best-we-forget-australias-70-year-old-nuclear-contamination-secrets-about-to-be-exposed/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=2024-07-04&utm_campaign=Michael+West+Media+Weekly+Update

While Peter Dutton gets headlines for his nuclear fairytale and the Labor Government presses on with its AUKUS submarines, the fallout from nuclear bomb testing in the Pilbara in 1956 finally reaches court. Sue Roff reports from London.

In 1956, on the remote Montebello Islands off Western Australia, an atomic bomb was tested. It was supposed to be no more than 50 kilotons, but in fact measured 98 kilotons, or more than six times the strength of the bomb dropped over Hiroshima in 1945.

Ever since then, Australian and UK Governments have suppressed the facts and denied compensation to the victims. That may finally be about to change.

Three months ago, veterans of Britain’s Cold War radioactive weapons tests formally launched proceedings against the UK Ministry of Defence, alleging negligence in its duty of care to the men themselves and their families before, during and after the tests that began at the Montebellos in 1952.

MWM, “The opening phase seeks the full disclosure by the Ministry of Defence of all records of blood and urine testing conducted during the weapons trials, with compensation sought for MoD negligence and recklessness if they were lost or destroyed.”

At the same time, the veterans have made an offer to resolve their claim through the creation of a Special Tribunal with statutory powers to investigate and compensate if decades of cover-up are established.

A very big bomb

In October 1955, the Director of British atomic and thermonuclear tests in Australia, Professor William Penney, wrote to the Chair of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority about the two detonations that were planned for the Montebello Islands in May and June 1956:

‘Yesterday I think I gave you the impression that the second shot at Montebello will be about 80 K.T. [kilotons]. This is the figure to which we are working as far as health and safety are concerned. We do not know exactly what the yield is going to be because the assembly is very different from anything we have tried before.

We expect that yield will be 40 or 50, but it might just go up to 80 which is the safe upper limit.

In fact, in recent years, it has been  listed on the website of ARPANSA [the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency] as 98 kilotons.

The politics

A UK memo found in the UK National Archives  that is undated but filed around August 1955, states:

“TESTS IN Montebello ISLANDS (CODE NAME ‘MOSAIC’) 25 7.

“We had agreed with the Australian Government that we would not test thermo-nuclear weapons in Australia, but [Australian Prime Minister] Mr. Menzies has nevertheless agreed to the firings taking place in the Montebello Islands (off the North-West coast of Western Australia), which have already been used before for atomic tests [emphasis added].”

“As already explained, the Australians are very sensitive on the question of thermo-nuclear explosions, and although the true character of these tests is understood by the authorities immediately concerned, knowledge of the trials is restricted to a very small circle and no public statement has so far been made; when it is made, it will therefore require very careful handling.”

“Apparently it is still being very carefully handled by government agencies. 70 years after the British atomic and thermonuclear tests started in Australia scores of files held in the Australian National National Archives are marked ‘Not yet examined’. We urgently need to create an independent archive of Australia’s nuclear past.”

The fallout

In Roeboure, some 200km away from the blast, a witness – then seven-year-old John Weiland wrote later of “hearing and feeling the blast before going outside to see the cloud. My mother said she remembers material falling on her. I was in primary school at the time and we all stood out on the verandah to watch the cloud.”

Weiland later wrote to ARPANSA asking “if any testing was done or any follow up done particularly with the 30 or so children of the school. But I was told there was no radiation blown across from the islands.”

In December 1957, eighteen months after the second G2 Operation Mosaic blast at the Montebellos, the five scientific members of the Atomic Weapons Safety Committee (AWSC) appointed by the Australian government published a report titled ‘Radioactive Fallout in Australia from Operation ‘Mosaic’ in The Australian Journal of Science.

without approaching the mainland of Australia.’ However ‘a pronounced stable layer produced a marked bulge on the stem which trapped a small quantity of particulate material and this was spread to the south-east of the Montebello Islands …The more finely suspended material’ or ‘debris’ was dispersed in the first 48 hours …’ although there was light rain over Marble Bar.

Thirty years after this AWSC report, the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia issued its 1987 report after 18 months of hearings around Australia and in London. In relation to Mosaic G2 it reported:

“7.4.25 The post-firing winds behaved similarly to those after Gl, i.e. they weakened and then began to blow to the south and east. An analysis of the trajectories of fallout particles showed that fallout at Port Hedland occurred 24 hours after the explosion and consisted of particles that originated from 20,000 feet in the region of the top of the stem and the bottom of the cloud….[RC 270, T24/57).”

“Clearly part of the main cloud did cross the mainland.”

The Royal Commission also concluded, “The Safety Committee communications with the Minister for Supply soon after the second explosion, when it reported that the cloud had not crossed the coast, with the implication that there was no fallout on the mainland, were misleading.”

Nearly forty years later, in January 2024, John Weiland submitted a query to the Talk to A Scientist portal of ARPANSA, asking for information. The unsigned response four days later referred him to Appendices B & C of a 32 year old document attached to the official response. A report, ‘Public Health Impact of Fallout from British Nuclear Tests in Australia, 1952-57, has a diagram annotated ‘Trajectories taken by radioactive clouds across Australia for the nuclear tests in the Mosaic and Antler Series. The main debris clouds from Mosaic Rounds 1 and 2 are not shown as they remained largely over the Indian Ocean, moving to the northeast parallel to the coast.’ (emphasis added).

This diagram [ on original) doesn’t correlate with the maps in the Royal Commission Report north of Broome nor those of the AWTSC report in 1957 south of Port Hedland.

I have published extensive archival evidence about the score of coverups that have occurred over the past 70 years.

The cover-up

They range from the agreement of Prime Minister Menzies to the progressive testing of hydrogen/thermonuclear devices in preparation for the full assembly in 1957 for the Grapple tests at Christmas Island, including testing less than two months before the start of the 1956 Olympic Games in downwind Melbourne, and Menzies’ hope of getting tactical nuclear weapons for Australia by his collusion.
They also include the submission of ‘sanitised’ health data on Australian test participants to the 1985 Royal Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia.

I presented my concerns about the role of UK official histories of the tests in a seminar hosted by the Official Historian of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office by invitation in February 2024.

Representing the victims, Oli Troen adds that “The Veterans previously sought redress through the English Courts, losing in the Supreme Court in 2012 when they could not prove they experienced dosages of radiation exposure. This meant they could not demonstrate their injuries resulted from that exposure.”

Blood tests taken at the time and in the years after presence at a test site are key to proving whether the legacy of rare illnesses, cancer and birth defects reported by the veterans is due to radiation from the nuclear tests and whether the government is culpable and can now be held accountable for their suffering.

A Freedom of Information tribunal has ordered the handing over of the blood tests of veteran and decorated hero Squadron Leader Terry Gledhill, who led ‘sniff planes’ into the mushroom clouds of thermonuclear weapons on sampling missions. This new case seeks to force the government to hand over such records for up to 22,000 UK veterans.

By Paul Keating, Sep 28, 2024,  https://johnmenadue.com/marles-with-all-pretention-flogging-a-dead-seahorse/

Richard Marles and his mate, the US defence secretary, are beginning to wilt under the weight of sustained comment in Australia critical of the AUKUS arrangement.

Marles, unable to sustain a cogent argument himself, has his US friend propping him up in London to throw a 10,000-mile punch at me – and as usual, failing to materially respond to legitimate and particular criticisms made of the AUKUS arrangement.

The US Defence Secretary, Lloyd Austin, claims AUKUS would not compromise Australia’s ability to decide its own sovereign defence issues, a claim made earlier by Richard Marles and the prime minister.

But this would only be true until the prime minister and Marles got their phone call from the president, seeking to mobilise Australian military assets – wherein, both would click their heels in alacrity and agreement. The rest of us would read about it in some self-serving media statement afterwards. As my colleague, Gareth Evans, recently put it, “it defies credibility that Washington will ever go ahead with the sale of Virginias to us in the absence of an understanding that they will join the US in any fight in which it chooses to engage anywhere in our region, particularly over Taiwan”.

In London, Marles claimed that the logic behind AUKUS matched my policy as prime minister, in committing to the Collins class submarine program. This is completely untrue.

The Collins class submarine, at 3,400 tonnes, was designed specifically for the defence of Australia – in the shallow waters off the Australian continental shelf.

The US Virginia class boats at 10,000 tonnes, are attack submarines designed to stay and stand on far away station, in this case, principally to wait and sink Chinese nuclear weapon submarines as they exit the Chinese coast.

At 10,000 tonnes, the Virginias are too large for the shallow waters of the Australian coast – their facility is not in the defence of Australia, rather, it is to use their distance and stand-off capability to sink Chinese submarines. They are attack-class boats.

When Marles wilfully says “AUKUS matches the Collins class logic” during the Keating government years, he knows that statement to be utterly untrue. Factually untrue. The Collins is and was a “defensive” submarine – designed to keep an enemy off the Australian coast. It was never designed to operate as far away as China or to sit and lie in wait for submarine conquests.

And as Evans also recently made clear, eight Virginia class boats delivered in the 2040s-50s would only ever see two submarines at sea at any one time. Yet Marles argues that just two boats of this kind in the vast oceans surrounding us, materially alters our defensive capability and the military judgment of an enemy. This is argument unbecoming of any defence minister.

As I said at the National Press Club two years ago, two submarines aimed at China would be akin to throwing toothpicks at a mountain. That remains the position.

The fact is, the Albanese Government, through this program and the ambitious basing of American military forces on Australian soil, is doing nothing other than abrogating Australia’s sovereign right to command its own continent and its military forces.

Marles says “there has been demonstrable support for AUKUS within the Labor Party”. This may be true at some factionally, highly-managed national conference — like the last one — but it is utterly untrue of the Labor Party’s membership at large – which he knows.

The membership abhors AUKUS and everything that smacks of national sublimation. It does not expect these policies from a Labor Government.

Global Peace and Justice Aotearoa, 12 Nov 24, Reprinted from Covert Action Magazine

Andrew Fowler’s book Nuked: The Submarine Fiasco That Sank Australia’s Sovereignty (Melbourne University Press, 2024) was not written by a member of the peace movement. That is both a strength and a weakness. A strength, because Andrew Fowler is an award-winning investigative journalist, who has worked in mainstream Australian current affairs TV. So, it can’t be dismissed as “anti-American, anti-military” propaganda.

But it is a weakness because the author never questions the basic tenet of the book’s subject—why does Australia need any submarines at all, regardless of whether they are conventionally powered or nuclear powered. The book’s focus is a forensic analysis of who won the highly lucrative battle to supply Australia’s new subs—it was all set up to be France but then, after hidden, sub-surface maneuvering worthy of one of the book’s subjects, Australia and the U.S. torpedoed the French and did a deal among themselves.

This book is about AUKUS (Australia, UK, U.S.), the new kid on the “Indo-Pacific” block—although it should be pointed out that the UK is an awfully long way away from either the Indo or the Pacific. It is an attempt to build a new Western military alliance, initially between those three countries but with the prospect of other countries (including New Zealand) joining the ill-defined AUKUS Pillar Two at some unspecified time in the future. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The book is about the birth of AUKUS, which is all about submarines.

AUKUS
I’ve written about AUKUS previously in Covert ActionMagazine, so I refer you to that for the back story. In 2016 Australia signed a $A50 billion contract for France to build it 12 state of the art conventionally powered submarines for the Australian Navy. It was the largest defence contact in the history of both France and Australia. The right-wing Liberal Party was in Government in Australia, headed by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

The book names names—the man who fronted the deception and betrayal of France was Scott Morrison, who replaced Turnbull as the Liberal Prime Minister in 2018, in an internal Party coup (a common occurrence in Australian politics). Behind the scenes, the key man was Andrew Shearer, “a vehemently pro-American China hawk” who went on to become Director-General of National Intelligence. Right up until just before AUKUS was announced in 2021, Morrison’s government continued to assure France that it was proceeding with the contract to buy French submarines.

Dumping France For the U.S.

Instead of 12 diesel-powered French subs, Australia signed up to have the U.S. and UK build eight nuclear-powered (but not nuclear-armed) subs for its Navy. The cost is astronomical—up to $A368 billion by 2055. Yes, that’s right—those eight subs will not be ready for more than 30 years. The first of them is unlikely to be ready until the 2040s so, to fill that gap, Australia will buy three existing U.S. subs from the early 2030s, at a cost of up to $A58b, with an option to buy two more. This is a staggering amount to spend on one military project from a country with a population of just under 27 million people.

“(AUKUS) was a clear victory for Washington, which had been concerned for some time that France had a different view on how to deal with the rise of China… There was barely a murmur of opposition from the media. Morrison had pulled off a major achievement of what U.S. public intellectual Noam Chomsky describes as the political art of ‘manufacturing consent’…”.

“How did it happen that the bulk of analysis and criticism of the submarine deal came from two former Prime Ministers, Paul Keating (Labor) and Malcolm Turnbull (Liberal) who, though on opposing sides of politics, were united in warning that the submarine deal stripped away Australia’s sovereignty……………………………..

Australia Expected To Fight Alongside U.S. In War With China

There is only the feeblest pretense that these nuclear submarines (still decades away from reality) will be used to defend Australia. Their role will be to patrol close to the Chinese coast, to hem in the Chinese Navy and, in the event of war, to attack China with cruise missiles. That’s the theory, anyway. The advantage of their being nuclear-powered is that they don’t have to return to port to refuel. U.S. hawks expect Australia to fight on its side in any war with China over Taiwan………………………………………………………………………………………..

Integration With U.S. Military

There is a lot more to the U.S.-Australia military relationship than some exorbitantly expensive nuclear submarines that may or may not ever materialise. There is the top-secret Central Intelligence Agency/National Security Agency Pine Gap spy base near Alice Springs, in central Australia, which is crucial to the global warfighting abilities of the U.S.  There is the North West Cape facility on the westernmost point of mainland Australia, which the US Navy uses to communicate with its nuclear attack subs. There is Australia’s increasing involvement with the U.S. military and intelligence satellite programme, in preparation for war in space.

“Australia’s integration with the U.S. military was, of course, well underway before the AUKUS agreement. As already noted, Pine Gap and North West Cape are part of this. But there is also the basing of thousands of U.S. Marines in Darwin (northern coast), the stationing of nuclear-capable B-52s at Tindal (Australian Air Force base, northern Australia), and the stationing of U.S. military throughout the Australian Defence Force, including from the National Reconnaissance Office at the military headquarters in Canberra… Though Defence Minister Richard Marles has ruled out automatic support of the United States in any war over Taiwan, it is difficult to see how Australia won’t be involved. Pine Gap, Tindal, North West Cape and Perth (Western Australia’s biggest city) will all be integral to the battle.”

Change Of Government; No Change Of Foreign Policy

Scott Morrison’s Liberal government was voted out at the 2022 Australian election and was replaced by Anthony Albanese’s Labor Party. But Australia’s commitment to AUKUS remained unchanged………………………………………………………………………………

“Nuked” specifically attributes Labor’s fervent desire not to be seen as “anti-American” to the events of 1975, when the Central Intelligence Agency and its local collaborators, succeeded in getting Gough Whitlam’s Labor government overthrown in a bloodless coup. The U.S. covert state was particularly concerned about Whitlam’s revelations about its Pine Gap spy base and possible threats to close it. Jeremy Kuzmarov has recently written about this in CovertAction Magazine (15/11/23), so I refer you to that.

For half a century the Australian Labor Party has lived in fear of the same thing happening again, and has bent over backwards to prove its loyalty to the U.S.

………The consequences of the fear that drove the ALP leadership to embrace AUKUS with barely a second thought will haunt them for years to come. Just as Morrison was only too willing to trade Australian’s independence for the chance to win an election, so too was Labor. Now it is left to make work a deeply flawed scheme that, more than ever before, ties Australia’s future to whoever is in the White House.”

Jobs For The Boys
And what has happened to Scott Morrison, who retired from politics in 2024? “Along with Trump’s former CIA Director, Mike Pompeo, Morrison became a strategic adviser to U.S. asset management firm DYNE Maritime, which launched a $157 U.S. million fund to invest in technologies related to AUKUS. ………

“Morrison also became Vice-Chair of American Global Strategies (AGS), headed by former Trump National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien. AGS, stacked with former Pentagon, White House and State Department officials, boasts that it ‘assists clients as they navigate U.S. government processes,’ a useful addition to any company wanting to boost profits in the burgeoning area of military spending.”

New Zealand & AUKUS

…………………………………………………………………………… There are plenty of similarities between Australia and New Zealand but also significant differences. Whereas Australian governments of either party fall over themselves to loyally serve the U.S. empire, New Zealand has been nuclear free by law since the 1980s (and it was an Australian Labor government, on behalf of the U.S., which tried to pressure New Zealand to drop the policy. That pressure backfired).

……………………………………………………………….But there is a constant push to get New Zealand further entangled in the U.S. war machine, including Pillar Two of AUKUS (which has been, thus far, only identified as involving “advanced military technology”). New Zealand currently has a very pro-American Government, which is already a non-member “partner” of NATO and which is eager to serve the U.S……………………………………..

Not All New Zealand Politicians Lining Up To Grovel To Uncle Sam.

For a refreshing contrast, here’s an extract from a recent (2/10/24) press statement from Te Pāti Māori, the indigenous party, which has six Members of Parliament (out of 123). “Meanwhile the New Zealand Government is in talks with the United States about joining AUKUS to further support their war efforts. This represents the next phase of global colonisation, and it is being negotiated behind closed doors,” Co-Leader Rawiri Waititi said.

“The U.S. wants to use Aotearoa as a Pacific spy base. This could mean the end of our longstanding nuclear free policy to allow their war ships into our waters. AUKUS threatens our sovereignty as an independent nation, and the Mana Motuhake of every nation in the Pacific. It threatens to drag Aotearoa into World War 3,” said Waititi.

“The New Zealand government is putting everyone in Aotearoa at risk through their complicity. They must end all talks about joining AUKUS immediately. They must sanction Israel and cut ties with all countries who are committing and aiding war crimes,” said Co-Leader Debbie Ngarewa-Packer………………………………. more https://gpja.org.nz/2024/11/12/nuked-the-submarine-fiasco-that-sank-australias-sovereignty-by-murray-horton/

 https://www.csiro.au/en/news/All/Articles/2024/December/Nuclear-explainer 9 Dec 24

In Australia’s transition to net zero emissions, the electricity sector has a major role to play. But does nuclear power have a place in our future grid?

Key points

While nuclear technologies have a long operational life, this factor provides no unique cost advantage over shorter-lived technologies.

Nuclear power does not currently provide the most cost competitive solution for low emission electricity in Australia.

Long development lead times mean nuclear won’t be able to make a significant contribution to achieving net zero emissions by 2050.

This explainer was updated on 09 December 2024 to reflect costings included in the draft GenCost 2024-25 Report.

As Australia works towards emissions reduction targets in the transition to net zero, we know the electricity sector has a major role to play. We also know it makes sense to assess a full range of technologies: some new and emerging, some established and proven.

In this context some proponents want nuclear to be considered as an option for decarbonising the electricity sector.

Despite nuclear power being a component of electricity generation for 16 per cent of the world’s countries, it does not currently represent a timely or efficient solution for meeting Australia’s net zero target.

Here’s why:

• Nuclear is not economically competitive with solar PV and wind and the total development time in Australia for large or small-scale nuclear is at least 15 years.
• Small modular reactors (SMRs) are potentially faster to build but are commercially immature at present.
• The total development lead time needed for nuclear means it cannot play a major role in electricity sector emission abatement, which is more urgent than abatement in other sectors.

Understanding GenCost calculations

GenCost is a leading economic report by CSIRO in collaboration with the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) to estimate the cost of building future electricity generation and storage, as well as hydrogen production in Australia.

It is a policy and technology neutral report and the annual process involves close collaboration with electricity industry experts. There are opportunities for stakeholders to provide pre-publication feedback, ensuring the accuracy of available evidence.

Paul Graham, our Chief Energy Economist and lead author of the report, said GenCost is an open and public process.

“The report’s data is not just for AEMO planning and forecasting; it’s also used by government policymakers and electricity strategists who require a clear, simple metric to inform their decisions,” Paul said.

“To facilitate a straightforward comparison across different technologies, the GenCost report conducts a levelised cost of electricity analysis. This method calculates a dollar cost per megawatt hour (MWh) over the economic life of the asset, incorporating initial capital expenses and any ongoing fuel, operation, and maintenance costs.”

The draft GenCost 2024-25 Report released on 09 December 2024 found renewables continue to have the lowest cost range of any new build electricity generation technologies.

[Excellent table here -on original]

One of the factors that impacts the high and low cost range is the capacity factor. The capacity factor is the percentage of time on average that the technology generates to its full capacity throughout the year. Costs are lowest if technologies. such as nuclear, can operate at full capacity for as long as possible so they have more generation revenue over which to recover their capital costs.

Nuclear technology is capable of high capacity factor operation but globally its capacity factor ranges from below 60% to above 90% with an average of 80%. Australia operates a similar steam turbine based technology in coal generation for which the average capacity factor over the last decade was 59% with a maximum of 89%.

The shape of the electricity load and competition from other sources is very different between countries and so our preference is to always use Australian data where it is available. Consequently, we apply the historical coal capacity factors when considering the potential future capacity factors of Australian nuclear generation.

Capital cost assumptions

While nuclear generation is well established globally, it has never been deployed in Australia.

Applying overseas costs to large-scale nuclear projects in Australia is not straightforward due to significant variations in labour costs, workforce expertise, governance and standards. As a result, the source country for large-scale nuclear data must be carefully selected.

GenCost estimates of the cost large-scale nuclear are based on South Korea’s successful continuous nuclear building program and adjusted for differences in Australian and South Korean deployment costs by investigating the ratio of new coal generation costs in each country.

The large-scale nuclear costs it reported could only be achieved if Australia commits to a continuous building program, following the construction of an initial higher-cost unit or units. Initial units of all first-of-a-kind technologies in Australia are expected to be impacted by higher costs. A first-of-a-kind cost premium of up to 100 per cent cannot be ruled out. These assumptions remain for the draft GenCost 2024-25 Report.

Life of the investment

GenCost recognises the difference between the period over which the capital cost is recovered (the economic life) and operational life of an asset.

GenCost assumes a 30-year economic life for large-scale nuclear plants, even though they can operate for a longer period. It is standard practice in private financing that the capital recovery period for an asset is less than its full operational life, similar to a car or house loan. For power stations, warranties expire and refurbishment costs may begin to fall around the 30-year mark. As a result, we use a 30-year lifespan in our cost calculations.

After the final GenCost 23-24 Report was released in May 2024, nuclear proponents clarified they will seek to achieve longer capital recovery periods, closer to the operational life, by using public financing to realise potential cost advantages.

The draft GenCost 2024-25 Report has calculated those cost advantages for the first time (using a 60-year period), finding that there are no unique cost advantages arising from nuclear technology’s long operational life. Similar cost savings are achievable from shorter-lived technologies, even accounting for the fact that shorter lived technologies need to be built twice. This is because shorter-lived technologies such as solar PV and wind are typically available at a lower cost over time, making the second build less costly.

The lack of an economic advantage for long-lived nuclear is due to substantial nuclear refurbishment costs to achieve long operational life safely. Without new investment it cannot achieve long operational life. Also, because of the long lead time in nuclear deployment, cost reductions in the second half of their operational life are not available until around 45 years into the future, significantly reducing their value to consumers compared to other options.

Current figures for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)

The Carbon Free Power Project was a nuclear SMR project in the United States established in 2015 and planned for full operation by 2030. It was the first project to receive design certification from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an essential step before construction can commence. In November 2023, the project was cancelled following a 56 per cent increase in reported costs.

Despite being cancelled, this project was the first and currently remains the only project to have provided cost estimates for a real commercial venture with detailed data. Until now, most sources were for theoretical projects only.

“The main area of uncertainty with nuclear SMR has been around capital costs,” Paul said.

“The Carbon Free Power Project provided more confidence about the capital costs of nuclear SMR and the data confirms it is currently a very high-cost technology.”

“We don’t disagree with the principle of SMRs. They attempt to speed up the building process of nuclear plants using standardised components in a modular system and may achieve cost reductions over time. However, the lack of commercial deployment has meant that these potential savings are not yet verified or realised,” Paul said.

Time is running out for the energy transition

Nuclear power has an empty development pipeline in Australia. Given the state and federal legal restrictions, this is not surprising.

But even if nuclear power was more economically feasible, its slow construction and its additional pre-construction steps, particularly around safety and security, limit its potential to play a serious role in reducing emissions within the required timeframe.

In the last five years, the global median construction time for nuclear has been 8.2 years. Furthermore, in the last ten years, no country with a similar level of democracy to Australia have been able to complete construction in less than 10 years. Overall, it will take at least 15 years before first nuclear generation could be achieved in Australia.

“The electricity sector is one of our largest sources of emissions and delaying the transition will make the cost of addressing climate change higher for all Australians,” Paul said

The electricity sector must rapidly lead the transition to net zero, so other sectors like transport, building and manufacturing can adopt electrification and cut their emissions.”

For further information visit the GenCost landing page 

nuclear power does not ‘back up” wind and solar as Dutton and O’Brien often claim, it must displace it. And in Australia, that’s likely to mean household solar first and foremost.

Giles Parkinson, Dec 9, 2024

Australia’s premier scientific organisation, the CSIRO, has patiently and methodically slapped down the major nuclear talking points promoted by Coalition leader Peter Dutton in its latest GenCost report, which confirms – yet again – that integrated wind and solar are easily the cheapest option.

The CSIRO first published the GenCost report in 2018, under the then Coalition government, and its conclusions have been consistent – integrated wind and solar are by far the best and lowest cost options. The new draft of the 24/25 version, which notes ongoing cost reductions in solar PV and battery storage, confirm this.

In short, it finds that firmed renewables, including transmission and storage costs, will cost between $80 a megawatt hour and $122/MWh in 2030, should they account for 80 per cent of variable generation, which is the federal government target.

That compares to between $145 and $238/MWh for large scale nuclear, and up to an eye-watering $487/MWh for so-called small modular nuclear reactors, which are part of the Coalition’s energy proposals, but which don’t exist in commercial form. The CSIRO says neither could be deployed before 2040.

See more details here: GenCost: Falling costs of solar and batteries confirm integrated renewables are cheapest option

The CSIRO, however, has also faced extraordinary and relentless attacks from the Coalition over its analysis, amplified by right wing so-called “think tanks” and the Murdoch media, and given a largely uncritical run in much of mainstream media.

Dutton’s and the nuclear lobby’s main beef with the CSIRO calculations is that it makes nuclear power look very expensive. Which it clearly is.

They argue the CSIRO report gives their favoured technology no credit for being long life (they say 60- 100 years), for having high capacity factors, and they insist that the CSIRO has got it wrong on its estimated build times.

The CSIRO has addressed each of these claims in its draft 2025 GenCost report. In fact, it is remarkable just how much of the report is devoted to a technology that it notes could not possibly be delivered in Australia before 2040 – and it forensically debunks the lot of them.

Benefits of longer life

Let’s go to the life time issue first, because it has been a particular focus of Dutton and his energy spokesman Ted O’Brien as they promote their nuclear campaign around the country.

They say that because nuclear power plants can last 60 or even 100 years, their huge up front capital costs should be smeared across the period, rather than the 30 years calculated by the CSIRO.

That sounds plausible, but the CSIRO makes a number of important points. Firstly, the 30-year calculation is standard practice for the energy industry because no financial institution will lend for longer.

And if loans were to be spread over a 60 year or 100 year period, the interest payments would be crippling. It means that the benefits of such calculations would be just 11 to 15 per cent – and not be experienced by Australian consumers until at least 45 years – or around 2070.

“It’s not a magical halving of costs or anything like that. The savings are relatively modest,” CSIRO chief energy economist Paul Graham says in the latest episode of Renew Economy’s weekly Energy Insiders podcast (to be published on Monday).

But there is another problem. The CSIRO also points out that if nuclear power plants are to last that long then they need regular refurbishment. Based on overseas experience, it puts the capital cost of those refurbishments at nearly one third of the original capital cost of the plants.

And it also puts a large hole in another linked Coalition argument, which is that wind and solar power must cost more because their facilities have to be replaced after 25 or 30 years.

The CSIRO says yes, they do need to be replaced. But when they are rebuilt, they will be rebuilt at considerably lower cost, and that’s not even taking into account the fact that wind and solar will be built where current facilities already exist, with connection points, land deals and other important infrastructure already in place.

“What we concluded from that was, actually it’s hard to identify any real unique benefit that nuclear delivers from having a long life,” Graham tells Energy Insiders.

“You can get the same benefit from shorter lived technologies, even when you have to build them twice, because both things essentially involve a reinvestment step. And when you look at the savings, they’re pretty similar.”

Indeed, the CSIRO puts the cost of rebuilt wind and solar at a considerable discount to refurbished nuclear – The experience in Ontario, the Australian nuclear lobby’s poster market, confirms this. (See table above -on original).

Each of Ontario’s main reactors will be off line for around three years – the cost is huge – and some of the world’s biggest batteries are being built to help fill in the gap, which torpedoes another nuclear lobbyist fantasy that somewhere these power plants do not need back up.

“It’s not a magical halving of costs or anything like that. The savings are relatively modest.

Capacity factors

The second issue is also critical. The nuclear lobby and the Coalition have told the CSIRO that it must calculate nuclear costs based on a 93 per cent capacity factor, and only at that rate.

This is important to them because – at such a high capacity factor – the nuclear plants are rarely switched off or even dialled down, and that gives the technology the best chance to recoup its high costs more quickly.

The CSIRO says that while such high capacity factors exist in the US, it is not the reality in the rest of the world, and is unlikely to be the case in Australia, particularly with the growth of rooftop solar and large scale renewables.

It says the global average capacity factor for nuclear plants is 80 per cent, and 10 per cent of nuclear power plant have capacity factors of less than 60 per cent. “On international data alone, the proposition of only considering 93% is not supported by the evidence,” Graham says.

And in Australia the experience of baseload power plants – in this case coal – is that they run at a capacity factor of around 59 per cent.

“In Australia we have more than 100 years of experience with operating baseload generation, not nuclear but coal,” Graham says,

“The average for black coal in the past decade is 59%. On this basis we cannot support the proposal that 93% adequately captures market conditions in Australia.”

It is interesting to note here that nuclear power does not ‘back up” wind and solar as Dutton and O’Brien often claim, it must displace it. And in Australia, that’s likely to mean household solar first and foremost.

Development lead times

The third argument that CSIRO addresses is that of the time it takes to build a nuclear power plant. This is important because the Coalition insists it can deliver its first nuclear power plant by 2035, although no one outside the Coalition and the nuclear lobbyists actually believe that.

“Many stakeholders have agreed with the GenCost estimate of at least 15 years lead time for nuclear generation,” the CSIRO report says. “Nuclear has no projects in the Australian development pipeline, has additional safety and security steps and needs new legislation and regulations.”

Where the nuclear lobby points to projects with faster lead times, CSIRO has looked at that too, and makes the interesting and relevant observation that these occur in countries where the democracy score is low, and where labour costs and protections are also low.

When it comes to small modular reactors, the Coalition argument makes no sense. They don’t actually exist in commercial form and it is unlikely any will be built before the end of the decade.

Dutton and O’Brien says they will only build an “nth of a kind”, meaning they will wait for the tech ology to be established and lower costs,.

But that is not going to happen in the timeframe that would allow the first power to be delivered by 2035.

The CSIRO, kindly, assesses its nuclear costs on an “nth of a kind” basis.

“We have been seeing all these big cost blowouts overseas, in countries like the UK and the US, and mostly it’s because these countries have come back (to building nuclear after a gap of several decades) and they’d lost all their knowledge about how to build nuclear,” Graham says.

So – after all that – and working through all the Coalition and nuclear lobby talking points – where does that put nuclear in comparison to other technologies?

“So large scale renewal, large scale nuclear, is sitting at a position one and a half to two and a half times the cost of firmed renewables,” Graham says on Energy Insiders.

“And if we look at small modular reactors …. that’s between about four to six times higher. And that’s because that’s really a pre commercial technology.

“We don’t really have any any sort of commercial deployment of that technology globally. So it’s still carrying some very high costs at the moment, which will come down once it’s once they successfully build a few more of them. But at the moment, it’s a very high cost.”

The report released on Monday is just a draft, and will go out to consultation until February, before a final report is prepared. In the meantime, the Coalition will release its own costings, and the CSIRO can expect some more blowback from the lobbyists.

“You do have to have a bit of a thick skin,” Graham tells Energy Insiders.

“But that’s the way we sort of improve things. And what’s been, I guess, unique about the last two years of GenCost is that the discussion that’s been had around it isn’t just a sort of energy insiders conversation, to forgive the pun, but it’s, it’s blown out into a sort of a, yeah, it’s much more of a public conversation.

“It’s not always at the level of sort of the sort of scientific and engineering discussion that we tend to have inside the industry, but that’s fine.

“We’ve adapted, and we’ve it’s given us a big opportunity to sort of deep dive into some of these topics, like nuclear that people want to hear about. So we’re sort of glad to do it. And we think we’ve, we hope people think that we’ve done a reasonable job of presenting fair and balanced information.”

By Victoria Fielding | 28 January 2025,  https://independentaustralia.net/politics/politics-display/media-coverage-of-duttons-nuclear-plan-scrutiny-stenography-or-propaganda,19

Unsurprisingly, the conservative media has failed to scrutinise Peter Dutton’s nuclear plan, once again displaying bias towards the Coalition, writes Dr Victoria Fielding.

WHEN OPPOSITION LEADER Peter Dutton snuck his dodgy nuclear energy “plan” out just before Christmas, it was an important moment for Australian news media to demonstrate the quality of journalism they produce: scrutiny, stenography or propaganda.

It was also their opportunity to be honest with the public about why Dutton is backing nuclear power, an opportunity they unsurprisingly did not take.

I analysed 37 news reports published by the ABC, The Guardian, News Corp and Nine newspapers on 13 December 2024, the day Dutton released his long-awaited “plan” for nuclear power. I categorised each article as either scrutinising the plan (a useful form of journalism that critically assesses the viability of the nuclear policy), as stenography (just repeating Dutton’s plan without scrutiny), or as propaganda (news presented to look like news but what is actually a form of political advocacy, aiming to persuade readers to support Dutton’s nuclear plan).

Here are the results.

In what will not be surprising to anyone, propagandistic content made up the majority of News Corp’s 20 articles about Dutton’s nuclear plan, with 14 out of 20 enthusiastically supporting nuclear power as a viable energy solution for Australia.

One notable example of this propagandistic approach by News Corp was in The Australian’s editorial on the subject which clearly gave away the views of the masthead.

‘…the Opposition Leader has taken an important and brave step, setting out the economics of the issue in a context relevant to concerns about living costs, especially power bills… Frontier’s modelling shows that the Coalition’s plan, incorporating nuclear and renewables, would cost $331 billion across 25 years, 44 per cent less than Labor’s renewables approach.’

Just like much of News Corp’s propagandistic content advocating for right-wing policies and politicians, the implied suggestion that nuclear is cheaper than renewables is manipulatively deceiving.

According to Climate Council reports using CSIRO’s analysis:

‘…the cost of electricity generated from nuclear reactors by 2040 would be about $145-$238 per MWh, compared to $22-$53 for solar, and $45-$78 for wind. So that’s at least twice as much for nuclear, or up to ten times as much when comparing with the lowest-cost solar.’

Dutton and his News Corp collaborators never let facts get in the way of manipulating voters.

Next, we have stenography. Stenography is the laziest form of journalism. Rather than doing the difficult work of analysis and being a watchdog to ensure only credible information is relayed to voters, stenographers just repeat what a politician has said, uncritically.

This has the effect of allowing manipulative politicians like Dutton to put information in the public domain which is false and/or misleading. Stenography is actually the opposite of what of journalism is meant to be.  

Nine’s newspapers published six articles which just lazily repeated Dutton’s nonsensical nuclear plan, giving it undue credibility and failing to adequately scrutinise it.

For example, Phillip Coorey in the Australian Financial Review authored a piece originally titled ‘New costings signal war over energy’, which starts with the sentence:

‘The Coalition’s nuclear power plan will cost up to $263 billion less than Labor’s renewable rollout between now and 2050, translating into cheaper electricity over the long run, its long-awaited economic modelling purports.’

Coorey would no doubt claim that he is not responsible for any manipulative or misleading content he has included in his article, because he is just reporting what Dutton said. But that is exactly the problem with stenography. Although it is not as bad as News Corp’s overt propagandist style, it still gives Dutton a platform to mislead the newspaper’s audience.

The only useful form of journalism out of the three categories is scrutiny. Indeed, the whole point of political journalism is to scrutinise politicians and policies to ensure voters are not misled and have useful information in which to make an informed decision when voting. All four outlets included at least some articles with extensive scrutiny of Dutton’s nuclear plan. News Corp had five and Nine published three.

The ABC (four articles) and The Guardian (three) were the only two outlets to only present Dutton’s nuclear policy alongside critical analysis.

One shining example of scrutiny from The Guardian’s Graham Readfearn and Josh Butler’s explainer, titled ‘The glaring gaps and unanswered questions in the Coalition’s nuclear plan and costings’, methodically lays out the facts and problems with Dutton’s plans — including the true higher cost comparison with renewables and the huge amount of time it would take nuclear to come online.

The ABC and The Guardian’s useful critique of Dutton’s plan is exactly the information that voters need to accurately appraise whether Dutton’s nuclear policy is beneficial to them and their community. No doubt News Corp and Nine would claim that this scrutiny just shows the ABC and The Guardian are “left wing”, but it shows no such thing. The ABC and The Guardian are doing a public service in scrutinising a major policy announcement and providing factual analysis comparing the real costs of nuclear and renewable energy.

If a left-wing party announced a different energy policy, they would do exactly the same thing. It is called public interest journalism.

Unfortunately, however, this is not the end of the story. There was one major element of Dutton’s nuclear policy which was only included in one of the 37 news reports I analysed — the motive behind Dutton’s nuclear push. This was included in The Guardian’s Readfearn and Butler explainer, albeit only in two after-thought quotes at the end of the piece.

Under the sub-title ‘How have critics responded?’ The Greens’ Adam Bandt was reported to have said “the nuclear strategy relied on extending the life of fossil fuels”. The Australia Institute’s Rod Campbell similarly said the nuclear plan was a “distraction to prolong fossil fuel use and exports”.

Disappointingly, no articles overtly pointed out to the public that the whole point of Dutton’s nuclear policy was to undermine investment in renewable energy, unsettling the transition to a low carbon economy, to slow down efforts to address climate change, all in aid of fossil fuel and mining billionaires. This exclusion is not just a small part of the story of Dutton’s nuclear policy, it is the story.

This truth, unfortunately, is the story journalists collectively have failed to tell.

Dutton’s proposal has seven nuclear power plants, including five large-scale reactors and two SMRs. This isn’t critical mass for a nuclear program. As of February 2025, the United States operates 94 nuclear reactors, France has 57, and South Korea maintains 26 reactors. Those are sufficient numbers of GW-scale reactors to achieve program economies of scale. Australia’s peak electricity demand of 38.6 GW isn’t sufficient to provide an opportunity for sufficient numbers of reactors of a single design to be built.

Michael Barnard, Feb 25, 2025,  https://reneweconomy.com.au/if-china-cant-scale-nuclear-australias-got-buckleys/

The platypus of energy in Australia has reared its duckbill and stamped its webbed feet again in recent years.

A fractious group of bedfellows is advocating for nuclear generation, primarily driven by the Liberal-National Coalition under Peter Dutton, who has proposed repurposing decommissioned coal-fired stations for nuclear power, with the remarkable claim that reactors could be operational between 2035 and 2037.

Other political supporters include the Libertarian Party and One Nation. Unsurprising advocacy organisations such as the Australian Nuclear Association, Nuclear for Australia, the Minerals Council of Australia, and the South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy are calling for legislative changes to allow nuclear development, citing its reliability and low emissions.

Notable figures like opposition energy spokesperson Ted O’Brien, who has chaired parliamentary inquiries into nuclear energy, and Indigenous leader Warren Mundine, who sees nuclear as an economic and climate solution, have also voiced strong support.

But nuclear energy, like the platypus, is an oddly shaped beast, and needs a very specific hole to fit into the energy jigsaw puzzle.

Successful nuclear programs share several key conditions, drawn from historical examples in the United States, France, South Korea, and the UK. These countries achieved large-scale nuclear deployment first by making it a top-priority national goal, tied to military strategy or energy security.

Bipartisan support ensured long-term stability, while military involvement helped enforce cost discipline and continuity over decades. Australia clearly doesn’t have bipartisan support for nuclear energy.

Previous countries found political consensus in the face of serious geopolitical threats from nuclear armed enemies such as the Soviet Union and North Korea. Australia isn’t threatened by invasion or nuclear war by any country, and the major political parties are clearly on opposite sides of the fence on the subject.

Teal MPs, supported by Climate 200 and a major new force, are in general not supportive of nuclear energy either.

Australia’s federal laws prohibit nuclear power development through the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), which explicitly bans the approval of nuclear power plants.

The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998 (ARPANS Act) restricts certain nuclear activities, reinforcing the ban. Both laws would have to be repealed or substantially altered, requiring draft legislation to start with. No draft legislation has been in evidence from the Liberal-National Coalition, which appears par for the course for a campaign plank which is very light on details.

If the Liberal-National Coalition were to regain power, they would first have to draft a bill, and then shepherd it through the extensive legislative process, something that with contentious bills can take up to two years. That’s just the beginning.

Australia’s status as a signatory to international nuclear non-proliferation treaties adds a layer of complexity to any move toward nuclear power. Compliance with agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would require strict oversight of uranium handling, enrichment, and waste disposal.

Any shift to nuclear energy could trigger lengthy negotiations with global regulatory bodies to ensure Australia remains within its non-proliferation commitments, delaying and complicating the development of a civilian nuclear program.

The duration for individual countries to negotiate and implement these protocols has ranged from a few months to several years, influenced by national legislative processes and political considerations.

Strong central control is another common factor in successful nuclear programs. National governments directly managed nuclear projects, maintaining tight oversight of construction schedules and decision-making. This approach prevented fragmentation and ensured that experienced leadership remained in place throughout the deployment.

In Australia, power systems are largely under state control, meaning any attempt to build nuclear power plants would require approval from individual state governments. While the federal government sets national energy policies and regulates nuclear safety, states have the authority over planning and construction approvals.

Several states, including Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia, have explicit bans on nuclear power, adding another layer of legislative hurdles. Even if the federal ban were lifted, nuclear development would still depend on state cooperation, making a nationwide rollout politically and legally complex.

Building a skilled workforce was essential to scaling nuclear generation. Successful programs invested in national education and certification systems, training engineers, construction workers, and technicians specifically for nuclear projects. Strict security measures were also necessary to vet personnel and prevent risks.

That’s challenging for Australia. The Australian National Training Authority (ANTA) was abolished on July 1, 2005, with all its functions transferred to the Department of Education, Science and Training. This move aimed to centralize vocational education and training (VET) oversight at the federal level, streamlining operations and reducing administrative complexities associated with the previous federal-state arrangements.

Despite this degree of centralisation, the administration and delivery of VET programs remain primarily under state and territory control, with public technical and further education institutes and private providers delivering courses under regional oversight.

While the coordination and policy aspects of ANTA’s functions persist at the national level, the execution and management of training programs continue to be managed by individual states and territories.

That’s not a good basis for a nationally run and managed nuclear workforce education, certification and security clearance program that would need to persist for thirty to forty years. A nuclear ANTA would have to be established, taking time in and of itself, and then it would take time to attract and create a critical mass of skilled nuclear engineering, construction, operation and security human resources.

Speaking of security, Australia’s nuclear ambitions come with an often overlooked cost: an immense, multilayered security burden that taxpayers will likely shoulder.

In the US, nuclear power requires an extensive web of international, national, state, and local security measures, yet much of this expense is not covered by reactor operators.

The US government funds $1.1 billion annually in international nuclear security, including protecting supply chains and waste management through agencies like the IAEA, the Department of Defense, and the CIA. These costs translate to $8 million per reactor per year, with a full lifecycle cost of $1.2 billion per reactor—expenses that remain largely hidden from public scrutiny.

Domestically, the security footprint is even larger. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, Homeland Security, and law enforcement agencies provide a $26 million per reactor per year security umbrella, ensuring compliance, protecting fuel transport, and defending against threats.

On-site security measures – including armed patrols, cyber protection, and emergency response teams – add another $18 million annually per reactor. In total, US taxpayers effectively subsidise $34 million per reactor per year, or $4 billion over a nuclear site’s lifespan, a cost that is rarely included in nuclear energy debates.

For Australia, these figures should serve as a stark warning. If nuclear reactors are built, the country will need to establish entirely new layers of security infrastructure, from federal oversight and emergency response teams to military-style site defenses.

The financial burden won’t fall on private operators alone – it will land squarely on the Australian taxpayer. As policymakers debate nuclear’s role in the country’s energy future, they must ask: are Australians ready to take on a security commitment of this scale?

A single, GW-scale, standardised reactor design was crucial to keeping costs under control. Countries that succeeded in nuclear deployment avoided excessive customization and focused on repeating a proven design, allowing for efficiency gains and predictable outcomes.

At present, there are various proposed reactor designs under consideration. Dutton’s proposal includes evaluating various reactor technologies, with a focus on South Korea’s APR1000 and APR1400 pressurized water reactors.

O’Brien has led a delegation to South Korea to study its nuclear power industry and assess the suitability of these reactor models for Australia.

It’s worth noting that while South Korea was successful in scaling nuclear generation, it did so with corruption that included substandard parts in reactors that led to a political scandal that resulted in the jailing of politicians and energy company executives.

Small modular nuclear reactors (SMR) have been proposed as part of the mix. They aren’t GW-scale and they don’t actually exist. As the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (ATSE) accurately pointed out in mid-2024, SMR technology remains in developmental stages globally, with no operational units in OECD countries.

The ATSE suggests that a mature market for SMRs may not emerge until the late 2040s, while I think it’s unlikely to emerge at all. Small reactors were tried in the 1960s and 1970s and were too expensive, leading to reactors being scaled up to around the GW scale in successful programs. There is nothing to indicate that anything has changed since then that will make SMRs successful and inexpensive the second time around.

Scale and speed mattered. Effective programs built between 24 and 100 reactors of very similar designs within a 20-to-40-year timeframe, ensuring that expertise remained within the workforce. Spreading projects over longer periods led to skill erosion and inefficiencies.

Dutton’s proposal has seven nuclear power plants, including five large-scale reactors and two SMRs. This isn’t critical mass for a nuclear program. As of February 2025, the United States operates 94 nuclear reactors, France has 57, and South Korea maintains 26 reactors. Those are sufficient numbers of GW-scale reactors to achieve program economies of scale. Australia’s peak electricity demand of 38.6 GW isn’t sufficient to provide an opportunity for sufficient numbers of reactors of a single design to be built.

Finally, strict adherence to design was non-negotiable. Countries that allowed constant innovation or design changes saw costs balloon and timelines slip. The lesson from history is clear: nuclear success depends on disciplined execution, a committed national strategy, and a workforce dedicated to repeating a single proven approach.

Australia’s strong engineering culture, known for innovation and adaptation, could pose challenges to a strictly controlled nuclear deployment program. Unlike industries where iterative improvements drive progress, nuclear power requires rigid standardization to control costs, ensure safety, and meet regulatory demands.

Australia’s history of engineering-led modifications – seen in mining, renewables, and infrastructure – could lead to pressures for design changes mid-project, a factor that has contributed to cost overruns and delays in nuclear projects overseas.

While flexibility has been a strength in other sectors, in nuclear energy, deviation from a single, proven reactor design undermines efficiency and drives up costs, making strict oversight and discipline crucial to success.

The late Yami Lester was blinded due to fallout from British nuclear testing at Emu Field. His daughter Karina addressed the UN in New York this week.

 https://www.sbs.com.au/nitv/article/nuclear-fallout-why-karina-lester-is-calling-on-australia-to-sign-the-treaty-banning-atomic-weapons/su09vd95k  7 March 2025

In the 1950s the British Government conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga and Emu Fields in South Australia.

Yankunytjatjara-Anangu woman Karina Lester, whose father the late Yami Lester went blind due to effects from the tests, wants to ensure no-one forgets.

On Thursday she spoke at the United Nations in New York as part of an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) delegation at the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

“Australia hasn’t signed and ratified the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons,” Ms Lester told NITV from New York.

“It’s really important to voice our concerns, and in particular as victims or affected communities of the British nuclear testing, so as a second generation survivor.”

On October 15, 1953, the British Army, with the support of the Australian Menzies Government, detonated a 9 kiloton nuclear bomb, called Totem 1, at Emu Field, 480km north-west of Woomera in South Australia, without warning any of the Anangu communities living nearby.

“Totem 1 was the first mainland test in Australia. The radiation fallout drifted over Dad’s community, Walyatjatjara community, where Anangu and Yankunytjatjara people were living and working on their traditional lands none the wiser of what was being conducted under 160km south,” Karina said.

“But they did witness the black mist rolling over their traditional lands, and there was huge impact for our people.

“For Dad, four years after those tests, his world turned into complete darkness.

“People on that day became really ill. Many of the older, weaker generation passed.”

Karina says there were ripples that are still felt today, more than 70 years later.

“Because we had the fallout fall onto our environment, our trees, animals, our sand dunes, our grasses, our food that we eat as well.

“So it’s been a long, generational story for my family, where the onus is always on the victim to be continuing to speak about these things and to speak about nuclear injustice.”

As part of the Aukus security treaty between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US, Australia has signed up to acquire nuclear-powered attack submarines and will be responsible for radioactive waste generated through operations, maintenance and decommissioning.

“Us South Australians are very concerned because we often are pressured to be the nuclear waste dump of the nation,” Karina said.

“There’s been many struggles in that area where Indigenous peoples and Aboriginal people of South Australia have needed to fight against government pressure looking for a nuclear waste dump and nuclear powered submarines will produce this waste.”

Karina also has concerns about Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s plan for nuclear power.

“These power plants are on traditional lands of Indigenous peoples across our nation and while there are seven locations that have been identified, yet the Coalition has not come to address and talk to Aboriginal people of those communities,” she said.

“There’s a strong message coming from South Australia that we certainly do not want nuclear power in our state, when we have been struggling and fighting against nuclear mining, nuclear waste dumps and nuclear testing.”

The nuclear industry has impacts on Indigenous peoples across the world, Karina pointed out.

“In our very own state of South Australia, they mine uranium, they tested in the 50s and 60s, they put pressure on the Aboriginal community to be the waste dump of the nuclear waste that is produced by industry,” she said.

“And now coming up with a bright idea of nuclear power.

“Aboriginal voices of South Australia have been strong to say ‘no nuclear power plants in our state’.

“So our strong message is, ‘no, we don’t want nuclear power’.”

Karina is disappointed that Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has not yet ratified the treaty against nuclear weapons.

“For us affected communities in very remote South Australia who carry the scars and carry this burden and this trauma of this lived experience through generations, now our government has failed us,” she said.

“We are out of sight and out of mind.”